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THE ONGOING REVOLUTION IN PUNISHMENT
THEORY: Doing Justice as Controlling
Crimet
Paul H. Robinson

*

You probably remember from your first-year criminal law class the age
old tension between the retributivists who want to punish offenders because
they deserve it, they see deserved punishment as a value in itself, and the
utilitarians (or instrumentalists), who believe that punishment must have
some more practical justification, such as avoiding future crime, perhaps
through deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation. The
dispute between these two groups is classically thought to be irresolvable.
The two are simply using different currencies and think different things to
be important.
One of the most exciting developments in current punishment theory
suggests that these two positions may not be entirely irresolvable, at least in
a sense. You all know the American Law Institute and the Model Penal
Code that it promulgated in 1962. Almost three-quarters of the states have
since codified their criminal law in ways modeled after that code. Last year,
for the first time in forty-six years, the Model Penal Code was amended to
change the section setting out the purposes of the code, its provisions, and
how those provisions are to be interpreted. And much of what I will talk
about today is the story, in intellectual terms, of how that change in
perspective came about.
I'll come back to the Model Penal Code amendment at the end of the
talk. Let me start with some background leading up to those recent events.
The most fundamental question for criminal law may be this: How can
we justify

having

a

system

that

imposes

punishment?

The

moral

philosophers have killed many forests answering this question but, to be
honest, I've always found it a bit boring. It seems to be a purely academic
debate. Every alternative purpose on the list of possibilities argues for the
same conclusion: Yes, we should have a criminal justice system that
imposes punishment. Such a system would be useful because it provides the
t
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opportunity to impose deserved punishment, to deter future offenses, to take
control of dangerous persons, to rehabilitate offenders that need it, and so
forth. It is no surprise that every known organized society has had some
kind of system of criminal justice that imposes punishment on wrongdoers.
The more difficult, but much more interesting question, is this: If we are
to have a criminal justice system, who is to be punished by that system, and
how much? This is not an academic question; it is in fact the core of what
criminal law and theory is about. It is a question of enormous practical
significance. What kind of instructions should a legislature give to a
criminal code revision commission? What kind of instructions should be
given to a developer of sentencing guidelines such as the United States
Sentencing Commission, created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984?
What sort of interpretive rules should a criminal code give to judges in
applying that code? What sort of rules should sentencing judges use in
exercising their discretion?
Unless we are to allow every individual commissioner and every judge
to just make things up as they go along, which would be obviously and
seriously problematic, we must provide some sort of guidance. If a
commissioner or judge must decide whether to adopt any given formulation
of a rule, or to adopt any particular interpretation, or to impose a particular
sentence that advances one purpose at the expense of another, what kind of
rational guidance can they be given in making that selection?]
These are particularly challenging questions. Because of the alternative
distributive principles that one might adopt to decide these issues, different
principles will distribute liability and punishment in different ways than will
any other.2 Thus, the central question in criminal law theory, the question I
want to talk about today, is: Which of the alternative principles (or which
combination of principles) for distributing criminal liability and punishment
should we rely upon?
First, for terminological purposes, let me list what I mean by each of the
alternative principles that I will mention.

1.

For a more detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, supra note t, at ell. I.

2.

For a more detailed discussion, see id at ch. 2.
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Each of these alternative distributive principles looks to a different
criterion and therefore would distribute different amounts of liability and
punishment to different people

in different situations.

Consider,

for

example, the case of the elderly man who was once a Nazi torturer. If one is
focusing purely on deserved punishment, this would be an easy case for
imposing liability because what the person has done is so horrible.
Similarly, if your focus is general deterrence, using this case as an
opportunity to dissuade others by the threat of liability and punishment for
engaging in such conduct in the future, then again, there is good reason to
punish. On the other hand, if one's focus is incapacitation or rehabilitation,
punishment in such a case may be a complete waste of resources. The
offender may no longer be a danger. Or, if the focus is special deterrence,
imposing punishment in order to deter future offenses by the offender at
hand, punishment again may be a waste of resources; this offender is not
likely to ever again have the opportunity to engage in such horrors.
Consider too the question of whether the criminal law ought to recognize
an excuse defense for people who are seriously mentally in and have,
because

of

that

illness,

committed

an

offense

without

realizing

its

wrongfulness. If the focus is desert, there is no blameworthiness and
therefore no reason to punish. Similarly, if the focus is special deterrence,
such people may well be sufficiently dysfunctional that they simply do not
understand, or cannot respond in a rational way to, the deterrent threat. On
the other hand, there may be very good reasons to deny an excuse defense

1 092
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and impose liability on the seriously mentally ill offender if one's
distributive principle is incapacitation or rehabilitation. The person has
already demonstrated that their mental illness makes them dangerous.
Finally, if the distributive principle were general deterrence, liability in such
cases could be an effective way of signaling all non-insane potential
offenders that the criminal law is quite serious about punishing this kind of
conduct, and that they ought not hold out some hope that they can commit
the offense but find some insanity loophole. Indeed, denying an insanity
defense can present a useful opportunity to reinforce the seriousness of the
deterrent threat.
Notice, most interestingly, that not only do different distributive
principles answer the insanity defense question differently, but that the
alignment of principles on each side of the question is different for the issue
of the insanity defense than it is for the previous issue of what to do with
the elderly Nazi torturer. Other questions will similarly generate altogether
different alignments.
Consider, for example, the question before a criminal code commission
that must decide whether to have attempts punished the same as the
completed offense or to have attempts punished less. A distributive
principle of incapacitation or rehabilitation would suggest that they be
punished the same, at least in the common case in which the attempter and
the successful offender are equally dangerous. Yet general and special
deterrence, and at least some forms of desert, would suggest that the
attempter be punished less.
In other words, the distributive principle we adopt for the criminal justice
system really does make a difference. We must make some choices. My
plan for the next forty minutes is to work through each one of the
alternative distributive principles and to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of each in the hope that, at the end of the process, we can step
back, evaluate the alternatives, and make some judgment about which
principle might seem most attractive (or at least decide which is the least
unattractive).
To give a hint at where we are headed, it turns out that none of the
alternative distributive principles are perfect. All have flaws. It will be a
complicated decision at the end to pick one or to try to construct some kind
of hybrid principle that combines two or more. That task will require us to
have a somewhat nuanced appreciation for the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the different distributive principles, so let us consider each in
turn.

42: 1 089] ONGOING REVOLUTION IN PUNISHMENT THEORY
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DETERRENCE

The most obvious strength of general deterrence is its enormous potential
efficiency. By punishing a few people, there is the potential for influencing
the conduct of thousands or hundreds of thousands of other potential
offenders. 3
On the other hand, however, there can be no deterrent effect unless
certain basic prerequisites are satisfied. First, the target must know the rule
by which we seek to influence the person's conduct. Second, the target must
be able and willing to calculate the costs and benefits for their own self
interest; that is, they must be able and willing to take the threat contained in
the deterrence-based rule and use it to decide how they will act. Third,
having done those calculations, the target must come to the conclusion that
the costs of the contemplated offense, in terms of punishment, outweigh the
benefits of the offense. Yet, as I'll discuss, these prerequisites commonly do
not exist. Situations in which they all exist, a necessary prerequisite for any
deterrent effect, are the exception rather than the rule.
Let's look at each of the three prerequisites in turn, to see the real world
complications that arise in trying to satisfy each. As to the first prerequisite,
that the target must know the rule by which we seek to manipUlate his
conduct, the studies suggest that offenders commonly don't know the rule.
How many people here know what the Arizona rule is on felony murder?
On "three strikes"? Not many, and most the people here are legally trained.
What are the chances that a young man standing outside of a convenience
store contemplating a robbery will know the rule? Yet it is this person
whose conduct the rule seeks to influence.
One thing that helps us in this instance is that the more involved a person
is in the business of criminality, the greater their incentive to actually learn
the criminal law's rules. But, what we know from studies is that even
criminals commonly have no idea what the rule is, and, even if they think
they know, they often have it wrong.
Even if the target knows the rule, there can be no deterrent effect unless
the person is able to take that information and use it to rationally guide their
conduct. The problem here is that the people most likely to be offenders are
the people who are most likely to be bad calculators, or be indifferent to
future consequences. They are more likely to be under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, anger, fear, group arousal, group identity shift, over
impulsiveness, mental illness, or a variety of other factors making them
dysfunctional in their calculations. This is not true of every offender, of

3.

For a more detailed discussion, see id at chs. 3-4.
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course. White collar offenders, for example, are much more likely to be the
rational calculators that deterrence requires.
Even if the target knows the rule and is a rational calculator, however,
there can be no deterrent effect unless the target perceives that the costs of
the contemplated offense outweigh its benefits. As Bentham has famously
suggested, this perception is the product of three things: the probability of
punishment, its intensity (its amount), and its timing (the delay of the
punishment following the offense). Let's look at each of these components
of the deterrence formula in turn .
The effect of probability-of-punishment on deterrent value gives us some
reason to be concerned. While we can't make too much of animal studies,
I'll cite a few different ones during my talk today, they can be useful in at
least giving a hint at where potential problems may be because many
species share the physiological reactions of humans. So, for example,
studies of rats suggest that deterrent effect drops off fairly quickly as the
punishment rate decreases. Where most offenses have a punishment rate of

100 or 50 to 1, it should not be complete surprise that this threat level
proves inadequate to deter.
We are helped here by the fact that people tend to exaggerate the
likelihood of rare events. That's why people buy lottery tickets. However,
the more a person is inclined toward criminality, the more they may have a
special incentive to sort out what the real rate of punishmen t is and thus
may discover that is quite low.
That people tend to exaggerate their own abilities also hurts deterrence.
That is, an offender may hear that another burglar has been caught and
punished but may discount the significance of this to him on grounds that he
is a much better burglar than the other person. The unfortun a t e bottom line
is found in studies like that by Anderson, who suggests that many if not
most offenders think the threat of punishment sufficiently low as to be of
limited importance to them.
Regarding the amount-of-punishment part of the equation, it seems clear
that we can, of course, impose punitive bite. What is less clear is whether
we can modulate the amount of punishment, as a deterrence-based system
would require. There are a host of facts that make it difficult to predict and
control the amount of punishment that will be felt and remembe red.
One well-known complication is found in the human tendency toward
discounting future benefits and costs. Thus, most people would prefer to

$ 1 00 in hand right now rather than anabsolute guarantee of $150 a year
from now, even though they can't eam 50 percent annual interest.

take

Another complication comes from what one might call "learning the
pain." Having trained rats to get food by pressing a bar, one can deter them
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from continuing to press the bar by applying an 80 volt shock. However, the
application of a 60 volt shock is not likely to deter. The animal will simply
take the pain to gain the food. If one gives a 60 volt shock (which the
animal will accept), then a 70 volt shock (which the animal will also
accept), then the 80 volt shock, the animal will not be deterred, because the
two lower-intensity shocks have taken away the value of the higher
punishment. The animal learns that he can indeed take the 60 volts and the
70 volts; thus the 80 volts no longer holds the intimidation value it had
when applied as the starting point. Indeed, when increasing incrementally,
the animal takes up to 300 volts before being deterred! The point here is
that the dynamic of deterrence can be a complex one.
Another source of complexity is ShO\\,l1 by subjective well-being studies.
Whether a person wins the lottery or becomes a paraplegic in a car accident,
it is not uncommon for the person to adjust their baseline perspective over
time. The lottery winner is ecstatic for awhile but may return to their old
cranky, unhappy self as their expectations adjust upwards. The same can
happen in reverse for paraplegics. This is not good news for a deterrence
regime, for it means that the bite of imprisonment is likely to dissipate over
time, making each successive unit of imprisonment less painful even though
the cost of each unit remains the same. This produces an increasing
inefficiency

as

the permitted prison term gets longer. The bar graphs below

illustrate the point. While policy makers tend to think in tenns of the "naive
calculation" in Bar 1, the reality is closer to the "adaptation calculation" in
Bar 2.
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In fact, human nature makes things even worse for deterrence. "Duration
neglect" studies suggest that it is both the maximum intensity and the
endpoint intensity that determine the remembered punitive bite, but that the
duration of punishment is of relatively negligible effect. This is particularly
significant when combined with the point just noted: that the punitive bite
of imprisonment naturally degrades over time. The longer the term of
imprisonment, the lower the perceived endpoint intensity. Thus, at least
theoretically, longer terms of imprisonment such as in Bar 2 below may be
remembered as having less total punitive bite than the shorter term of
imprisonment in Bar 3, because the important endpoint intensity dissipates
over time in Bar

1.
BAR 2
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Regarding the last component of the deterrence formula, the delay in
punishment, consider another animal study. Hungry dogs are given separate
bowls containing good tasting food and bad tasting food. At a session after
they have sorted out which is the good tasting food, they are allowed back
into test room and immediately go for the good tasting food but then are
bonked on the nose with a newspaper by the experimenter (bonking being
an experience that dogs do not like). Some dogs are bonked immediately,
some after a 5-second delay, and some after a I5-second delay. When the
dog is later allowed back into the room, we can see how the different delay
periods affect the length of time it takes them to return to the good tasting
food. The dogs bonked after I5-second delay take three minutes to try
eating the good tasting food again. In contrast, those dogs bonked more
quickly, after only a 5-second delay, take eight days before they risk eating
the good tasting food again! Those bonked immediately take two weeks
before they try again. Clearly, the timing of punishment can be highly
influential on deterrent effect.
Given that in the criminal justice system punishment is almost always
long delayed, on average seven months after a guilty plea and thirteen
months after trial and conviction, one may worry that the delay can
seriously undermine the deterrent effect. Again, the point here is simply that
deterrence is a complex business with complex dynamics, and there are
many ways in which deterrent effect can be lost.
Compare these difficulties in establishing the costs of crime, low
probability and long delay, with the perceived benefits of a crime, which are

[Ariz. St. L.J.
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likely to be perceived as having a high probability (because of the low
capture rate) and an immediate tangible benefit.
This skepticism about the satisfaction of the three prerequisites for
deterrence

is compounded

by

additional independent

concerns about

complexity in the application of a deterrence program. The problem of
substitution effects, for example, is well known. Even if a deterrence
program is successful, it might simply drive offenders to commit more
serious offenses, as Katyal has noted. Adding to the problem are dynamic
effects. By being successful in creating a deterrent effect, one is likely to
necessarily alter the parameters of the deterrence equation for the future, as
Bar-Gill and Harel have suggested. 4
Ultimately, the difficulties of deterrence are shown in the aggregated
effect studies, which use real-world experiments, such as gauging crime
rates before and after a rule or policy change, to determine whether the rule
or policy has had the desired deterrent effect. The studies are useful because
even if it seems that the prerequisites for effective deterrence are not
present, it might be that there nonetheless may be a deterrent effect that
somehow operates in ways that social scientists do not yet understand.
But the studies suggest just the opposite. That is, they seem to bear out
the conclusion that effective deterrence is possible only if the prerequisites
are satisfied, but that the prerequisites commonly are

not

satisfied. The

studies show that even when reformers actively seek to increase deterrence,
there is most commonly no effect, and where there is any effect it is at best
near trivial and often unpredictable, sometimes increasing a particular sort
of crime rather than reducing it.
This is not to say that deterrence can never be increased through the
manipulation of legal rules. Under special circumstances, where all three
prerequisites are satisfied, one can produce a modest deterrent effect, albeit
one that can quickly fade. The ultimate conclusion, then, is not to reject
deterrence as a distributive principle, but rather to understand that it has
specific requirements and has limited situations in which it can be effective.
Its strengths and weaknesses might be summarized this way. (I'll provide
such a summary for each alterative distributive principle to make it easier to
compare them in a single table at the end.)

4.

See generally Oren

Bar-Gill & Alon Harel, Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The

Economics of Deterrence Revisited, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 485 (2001).
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REHABILITATION

There are reasons to be skeptical about rehabilitation as a distributive
principle for criminal liability and punishment.s First, such programs
typically work only for lirrrited kinds of offenses and offenders. When they
do work, the effects tend to be quite modest. Perhaps even more
problematic, if rehabilitation were the sole distributive principle for liability
and punishment, the system would release all offenders who could not be
rehabilitated, which would probably be the majority of those incarcerated
today. Needless to say, this would likely be seen as unworkable by anyone,
whether their interest is in crime control or in doing justice. It probably
explains why no known system has ever used rehabilitation as its sole
distributive principle. We will consider later whether rehabilitation rrright be
used as part of a hybrid distributive principle in conjunction with some
other principal. For example, one might construct a hybrid distributive
principle that relies upon rehabilitation but if rehabilitation is not possible,
reverts to incapacitation.
On the other hand, rehabilitation might be a very good correctional
policy. That is, one rrright want prison wardens and probation and parole
officials to use rehabilitation programs as much as possible for those
offenses and offenders were rehabilitation is, in fact, possible. Used under
the right circumstances, it could well be a good investment. What is
problematic is using rehabilitation as the basis for deciding who the
criminal justice system should restrain and for how long.
5.

For a more detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, supra note

t, at ch. 5.
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One last point is worth mentioning. There may well be special value to
rehabilitation apart from its crime control potential. Most would agree that
there is intrinsic value in helping people to change themselves to live more
useful and satisfying lives to their full potential.

III.

INCAPACITATION OF THE DANGEROUS

Unlike deterrence and rehabilitation, there is no doubt that incapacitation
can effectively control future crime. It does work. And I think it equally
clear that there is general agreement that society has a right to protect itself
by restraining dangerous persons, as it does now with the civil commitment
of those who are mentally ill, who have contagious diseases, or who have a
drug dependency. 6
The weakness of incapacitation comes from its use as a distributive
principal for criminal liability and punishment within the criminal justice
system. The problem is that the system, for good reasons that I'll talk about,
continues to advertise itself as being in the "criminal justice" business, as if
it was designed solely to punish people for past offense. Thus, when the
system is being used for preventive detention purposes, incapacitating
persons in order to prevent future crimes that we think they may commit, it
must "cloak" its preventive nature; it must continue to pretend that it is only
bringing about justice for a past offense. And it is that preventive-detention
use of the criminal justice system, with its attendant "cloaking," that
produces serious problems. To telegraph my conclusions: Such a practice
undermines the system's predictive accuracy, which in tum reduces its
preventive effectiveness and efficiency. At the same time, it increases the
criminal justice system's unfairness to detainees and undermines the
criminal justice system's moral credibility with the community, which in
tum reduces its normative crime control effectiveness.
One may wonder: Why bother doing preventive detention within the
criminal justice system? Why not do it as part of a separate, open, civil,
preventive detention system? There are good reasons why not: System
designers do in fact have reasons for being attracted to preventive detention
cloaked as criminal justice, rather than to open preventive detention.
The older people in the audience may remember the political upheavals
of the 1970s that surrounded what were rather modest proposals for open
preventive detention, such as detention after arrest pending trial. These
battles produced enormous political pressure. By cloaking preventive

6.

For a more detailed discussion, see id. at ch. 6.
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detention as criminal justice, system designers can get where they want to
go without this "heat" on their backs.
The cloaking also allows the system to avoid the limitations that
logically follow preventive detention, such

as

the legal limitations that we

put on civil commitment. More on this in a moment.
Finally, cloaking preventive detention as criminal justice also has the
benefit of reducing the visibility of the criminal justice system's shift away
from deserved punishment. This is important because greater openness
about this shift would tend to undermine the criminal justice system's
"moral credibility" and thereby undermine its normative crime control
effectiveness. I'll discuss this in more detail when we take up desert as a
distributive principle.
While one can understand why such cloaking is attractive to system
designers, the fact is that such cloaking is also seriously problematic for the
effectiveness of preventive detention. Let me give two examples.
Where the goal is incapacitation of dangerous offenders through the
criminal justice system, it is common to use a person's criminal history,
rather than a direct quantification of their current harmfulness, as the
measure of their dangerousness. This is because the former appears to be
related in some way to the offender's blameworthiness, and thus looks more
like justice. That is, it makes the criminal justice system look more like it is
doing criminal justice and less like it is doing preventive detention.
Unfortunately, criminal history is a significantly less accurate predictor of
future criminality than would be a direct clinical assessment of a person's
dangerousness.
To give another example, when preventive detention is being done
within the criminal justice system it commonly uses determinate sentences,
rather than release decisions contemporaneous (or nearly so) with release.
That is, judges impose a sentence, including the release date, at the time of
sentencing rather than delaying the decision until the time when release is
contemplated. For cloaking purposes, this practice makes good sense: all of
the factors affecting deserved punishment are available at the time of
sentencing. If preventive detention is to be cloaked as doing justice, there is
little justification for delaying the release decision.
The difficulty with this cloaking practice is that making release decisions
at the time of sentencing significantly reduces their accuracy for preventive
detention purposes. It is difficult enough to predict future criminality at the
time of release. It is much more difficult to accurately predict future
criminality months or years or decades earlier, when the offender is initially
being sentenced.

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL
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These kinds of cloaking practices are bad for effective and efficient
preventive detention because by reducing predictive accuracy, they provide
less protection at greater cost. Relying upon criminal history as the stand-in
for dangerousness, for example, means that dangerous persons can be
released because of insufficient criminal history. Consider the case of
stalking as a first conviction. If social scientists can reliably predict that the
stalking will mature into greater violence, good prevention would favor
detention, but the lack of criminal history would translate into immediate
release.
At the same time, relying upon criminal history as the stand-in for
dangerousness means that non-dangerous persons will be detained simply
because they have a criminal history or because they were dangerous back
when they were sentenced. The problem is apparent in the operation of the
"three strikes" rule.

The common trajectory for violent offenders is

increased violence in the late teens and 20s, the testosterone years, that
trails off as the offender gets older. Thus, the focus on criminal history
under "three strikes" means that the young offender runs free during his
most violent time, as he is building his criminal history, then is imprisoned
after he has finally reached his third strike-often as his violence is
naturally tapering off

This, unfortunately, tends toward producing a

collection of geriatric nonviolent detainees.
Not only is preventive detention cloaked as criminal justice bad for
effective preventive detention, it is also unfair to detainees. By doing
preventive detention under the guise of criminal justice, it avoids the
limitations that logically should constrain it.

Specifically,

where the

justification for detention is the prediction of future criminality, the system
logically ought to have a principle of minimum restraint. That is, the
preventive detention rationale justifies no more restraint than is necessary to
protect

society,

imprisonment.

which

may

mean

the

use

of

methods

Preventive detention

also

logically means

other

than

nonpunitive

conditions, as is now the case with civil commitment of the mentally ill. It
also means a right to treatment, if that treatment can reduce the need for
further detention. It also means a right to periodic review. That is, the
government ought to have to regularly show continuing dangerousness if it
seeks to continue preventative detention. Finally, a preventive detention
system logically would set some minimum decision standards, requiring, for
example, some defined minimum likelihood of a violation, some minimum
defmed level of harm seriousness threatened, and some minimum defined
level of predictive reliability.
By using incapacitation as a distributive principle for criminal liability
and punishment, all of these logical limitations called for by a preventive
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detention system are avoided. If we are to have preventive detention, and
there are good arguments for why society ought to be able to protect itself
with such a system, it would be better for both society and for detainees to
have that preventive detention done openly through a system of civil
commitment rather than cloaked

as

a system of criminal justice.

I understand the resistance of many: that permitting such an expansion of
a civil commitment system would be dangerous. This has been discussed as
what

one

might

call

the

"Gulag

Archipelago"

Problem.

Liberal

democracies, and American values in particular, naturally want to put
significant limits on the power of govemment to intrude in the lives of its
citizens. Punishing criminals is one thing, but detaining people based only
on a prediction of future criminality is another.
However, the important point here is that our current practice of doing
preventive detention cloaked as criminal justice creates the potential for
greater abuse, not less. It avoids the scrutiny that an open preventive
detention system would attract. It avoids the logical constraints to which
preventive detention should be subject.
If you have any doubt about this, imagine the Rummel case coming
before the Supreme Court as a preventive detention case rather than as a
criminal justice case. Rummel was convicted of a third minor fraud and
under a three strikes statutes was sentenced to life imprisonment. The
Supreme Court held the sentence constitutional. There are many good
reasons not to constitutionally constrain the criminal justice sentencing
process too tightly; criminal justice does sometimes need life imprisonment
as a punishment. But if Rummel had come before the Court

as

a preventive

detention case, which in reality its three-strikes predicate made it, one can
imagine that it would not have passed the Court's laugh test. Automatic life
detention to avoid another minor fraud offense? I don't think so.
The strengths and weaknesses of rehabilitation and incapacitation might
be summarized this way:
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IV.

EMPIRICAL AND DEONTOLOGICAL DESERT

I noted earlier that desert as a distributive principle would give criminal
liability and punishment according to an offender's blameworthiness, which
would take account of the extent of the harm or evil of his conduct, his
culpable state of mind at the time of the offense, an assessment of his
personal capacities that might shape what we could reasonably have
expected of him, and a variety of other factors.
I have distinguished here the traditional deontological desert from what

has been called "empirical desert." The former is an assessment of moral
blameworthiness logically derived from principles of right and good,
typically by moral philosophers. The latter is derived from social science
studies of a community's shared intuitions of justice. Empirical desert is not
"true justice" in a transcendent sense but only a representation of the
principles by which the community actually makes judgments about
justice.7
It is obvious why one might care about doing justice in a deontological

sense. Why might one care about empirical desert? Why might empirical
7.

For a more detailed discussion, see id at eh. 7.
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desert be an attractive distributive principle for criminal liability and
punishment? The short answer, we will say, is that it might make sense for
instrumentalist

crime

control

reasons.

We

will

come

back to

that

revolutionary idea-that doing justice, at least in an empirical desert sense,
might be an effective crime control strategy-because it does put a new
spin on the traditional view that the retributivist interest in doing justice and
the instrumentalist interest in controlling crime are inevitably in conflict.
To work up to this conclusion, let me give some background from the
social science studies of the past decade or more. 8 Laypersons see
punishment as something that is properly imposed according to desert, that
is, blameworthiness. When they are asked to assign punishment, they don't
look to the factors that determine dangerousness or deterrence, but rather to
the offender's moral blameworthiness.
As

discussed

earlier,

the

traditional

instrumentalist

crime-control

principles of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation each conflict with
a desert distribution of punishment. If any of these principles were used for
distributing criminal liability and punishment, the system would regularly
do injustice and would often fail to do justice. Conversely, if the system
adopted a desert distribution, it would not be optimizing deterrence,
incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation.
However, a desert distribution of criminal liability and punishment

would provide some significant opportunity for deterrence, incapacitation of
the dangerous, and rehabilitation, albeit not the maximum that is possible.
That is, deserved punishment can have a deterrent effect, can incapacitate,
and can provide the opportunity for rehabilitation. The important point here
is that to increase any of these instrumentalist effects, the distribution of
criminal liability and punishment must deviate from desert, that is, it must
do injustice or must fail to do justice
Do crime-control instrumentalists have any reason to care about whether
the criminal justice system regularly does injustice or fails to do justice? As
iustrumentalists, deviating from true justice (deontological desert) may be
just an unfortunate necessity of fighting crime, one might argue. However,
social science hints that there may be practical real-world crime-control
complications that arise from regularly deviating from the community's
perceptions of justice (that is, from empirical desert).
Here's how. We are becoming increasingly aware of the enormous
power of social influence and internalized norms. The behavioral decisions
that people are constantly making in their daily lives are driven primarily by
a concern for what others, especially family and friends, will think of them

8.

For a more detailed discussion, see id. at ch. 8.
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and for what they think of themselves. The criminal law can harness these
normative forces if it earns a reputation as a moral authority, that is, if
people come to see it as a system that reliably punishes in ways consistent
with people's intuitions of justice.
A criminal justice system that has earned moral credibility within the
community is in a position to harness the power of stigmatization, for
example, a highly efficient mechanism for influencing conduct. It lacks the
high costs of imprisonment,

yet can significantly

influence people's

conduct. In contrast, if the criminal law fritters away its moral authority by
imposing criminal liability and punishment that deviates from empirical
desert, it increasingly undermines its ability to stigmatize conduct through
criminalization or punishment.
A criminal law that has earned a reputation as a moral authority also has
a greater ability to avoid vigilantism, which is classically sparked when the
community sees regular failures of justice that it finds intolerable. Similarly,
a criminal justice system that regularly does injustice andlor fails to do
justice is one that risks prompting resistance and subversion, and loses its
ability to gain the acquiescence and cooperation that a criminal justice
system relies upon, by witnesses, jurors, offenders, and most participants in
the criminal justice and correctional process.
The criminal justice system that has earned moral authority also has a
greater chance of gaining compliance in borderline cases where the actual
condemnability of the conduct may be unclear. When insider trading first
became a crime, for example, it may not have been immediately obvious to
everyone that this conduct was qualitatively different from other forms of
aggressive entrepreneurship that are tolerated and even encouraged. If the
criminal justice system has earned a reputation as a reliable guide to what is
and is not condenmable conduct, it is more likely to gain the deference of
the community when it announces that insider trading has crossed a line and
is indeed condenmable.
Perhaps the most powerful effect of gaining moral credibility is the
influence that such credibility gives to the system in the larger public
conversation by which societal norms are shaped. If we want to change
people's thinking about the condenmability of domestic violence, or drunk
driving,

or

downloading music from the Internet without a license,

criminalization of that conduct or increasing the penalty to signal greater
seriousness of the conduct can help reinforce the norm against it. In
contrast, a criminal justice system that has squandered its moral authority
by regularly deviating from desert is one that is more likely to be ignored
during the public conversation because its view may be discounted as just
one more example of how the system gets it wrong. (Understand that any
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criminal law, even one with moral credibility, may no t be able to establish a
strong societal norm by itself. That is the lesson of Prohibition. A strong,
and eventually internalized, norm requires concurring views from a variety
of sources of moral authority, including social institutions as well as circles
of friends and acquaintances.)
One may conclude, then, that the crime-control power of the criminal
law depends in some significant part upon how well it tracks the
community's shared intuitions of justice. Thus, let me say a few words of
background about lay intuitions of justice. First, we have learned that
people's intuitions of justice are quite nuanced and sophisticated. Small
changes in facts can and do produce large and predictable changes in
liability judgments. And sophistication does not depend upon people's
education or intelligence; it seems to be the standard form.
Even more surprisingly, there appears to be an enormous amount of
agreement about intuitions of justice across all demographics, at least with
regard to the core of wrongdoing-physical aggression, taking property
without consent, and deceit in exchanges. The agreement here is on the
relative blameworthiness of different kinds of offenses and offenders, not
on the absolute amount of punishment to be imposed. However, once a
society commits itself to a punishment continuum endpoint, as every society
must do (whether it is the death penalty, or life imprisonment, or twenty
years), the large number of cases of distinguishable blameworthiness must
be fit on this limited punishment continuum. Thus, each case will end up
requiring a specific amount of punishment, not because of any magical
connection between that amount of punishment and that offense but rather
because that specific amount of punishment is required to put that case in its
proper ordinal rank among all other cases. (If one changes the punishment
continuum endpoint--different SOCIetIes do have quite different
endpoints-then the specific punishment required to put each case its
proper ordinal rank would also change.)
One may well ask how well current American criminal law matches the
community's intuitions of justice. The short answer is: not well. Modem
crime-control programs, such as three strikes, high drug-offense penalties,
adult prosecution of juveniles, narrowing the insanity defense, strict liability
offenses, and the felony-murder rule, all distribute criminal liability and
punishment in ways that seriously conflict with lay persons' intuitions of
justice.
To summarize, then, the strengths and weaknesses of the empirical and
deontological desert might be presented this way:
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SELECTING A DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE

We have now considered each of the alternative distributive principles,
and it is time to answer the question with which we started: What should be
the principle by which we distribute criminal liability and punishment?
All of the alternative distributive principles are flawed in one way or
another. Are we compelled to adopt the least flawed of the group? Or, could
we combine two or more distributive principles in one way or another to
create a hybrid?9
The original "purposes" section of the Model Penal Code provided a
hybrid of sorts: a laundry list of all of the alternatives, without any
articulation as to how they were related to one another. IO The problem was
that when they conflicted with one another-which we know happens
regularly-the Code's provision provided no guidance as to how that
conflict was to be resolved. Worse, by seeming to provide a means of
principled decision making, it created a fa�ade that hid the real potential for
abuse: A decisionmaker could simply reverse-engineer the process and
announce a "principled" decision, by simply deciding what result he
wanted, for whatever unarticulated reason, then looking to the laundry list
of alternative distributive principles to determine which one would give that
result; he could then announce a decision "based upon" that selected
distributive principle.

9.
10.

For a more detailed discussion, see id. at chs. 10-1l.

See MODEL PENAL C:ODE § 1.02 (Official Draft 1962); see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-101 (2010).
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A principled system must look to a distributive principle that defines the
interrelation among alternatives. In its recent amendment, the American
Law Institute adopted a revised "purposes" provision that did just this.
Here's the text of the new provision:

(2) The general purposes of the provIsIOns governing the
sentencing and corrections, to be discharged by the many official
actors within the sentencing and corrections system, are:
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing and correction of
individual offenders:
(i) to render punishment within a range of severity
proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to
crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders;
(ii) when possible with realistic prospect of success, to
serve goals of offender rehabilitation, general deterrence,
incapacitation of dangerous offenders, and restoration of
crime victims and communities, provided that these goals are
pursued within the boundaries of sentence severity permitted in
subsection (a)(i);
(iii) and to render sentences no more severe than
necessary to achieve the applicable purposes from subsections
(a)(i) and (ii);

II

.

...

As you see, the A.L.I. has adopted desert as the Model Code's dominant
distributive principle. One may speculate that it came to this conclusion for
the kinds of reasons reflected in the analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of alternative principles that we have just worked through.
As hinted at above, this position seems to resolve the traditional
retributivist-instrumentalist "irresolvable tension"�but only in a sense. It
suggests that there is good crime-control utility in doing justice, and in that
sense rests upon an instrumentalist rather than a deontological perspective.
However, given the practical realities of assessing desert principles, it may
be

that empirical desert

offers

the

best

practical

approximation

of

deontological desert, and for that reason the position may be highly
attractive to the retributivist perspective.

12

One final note is in order. Our focus here has been on how to construct
the best principle for distributing criminal liability and

punishment.

Obviously, this is an important inquiry�the most important, the most
fundamental in criminal law theory. However, we must not lose sight of the
fact that in the larger scheme of things the issue of the proper distribution of

Il.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (2007).

12.

See Paul

H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between
REv. 1 831, 1834-40 (2007).

Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L.
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criminal liability and punishment is only one of many important
mechanisms for controlling crime, and perhaps not even the most
significant.
Within the criminal justice system, the selection of policing and
correctional policies can be of enormous importance. Outside of the
criminal justice system, investments in education, social institutious, job
training, mental health, and a host of other projects can have as or more
important effects on the crime rate.
The point is this: don't expect too much from the criminal law's
distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment. It is essential for
doing justice and can make a significant contribution to crime control, but it
can do only part ofthe work.
Thank you.

